Summary. One version of the Coase Theorem is, If property rights are fully allocated, competition leads to efficient allocations. This version implies that the public goods problem can be solved by allocating property rights fully. We show that this mechanism is not likely to work well in economies with global externalities because the privatized economy is highly susceptible to strategic behavior: The free-rider problem manifests itself as a complementary monopoly problem in an associated private goods economy. Thus, our work relates the validity of the Coase Theorem to the literature on the incentives for strategic behavior in economies with complementarities.
Introduction
In this paper we establish the equivalence between a class of economies with externality problems and a class of economies with complementary monopoly problems. We also establish a similar equivalence between economies with public goods problems and those with complementary problems. We show that it is difficult to decentralize efficient outcomes in economies with complementary
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Our results are related to the extensive literature on externalities and public goods in several ways. It is useful to begin by identifying two broad approaches to solving allocation problems in such settings. The first approach, identified loosely with Coase (1960) , holds that if property rights are fully assigned, competition will lead to an efficient allocation. This statement has come to be known as the Coase Theorem. The second approach, even more loosely associated with Samuelson (1954) , espouses quite a different view, holding that individuals will strategically misrepresent their true desires regarding the provision of public goods. This free-rider problem will lead to inefficient public goods provision.
We show that in global externality/public goods environments the free-rider problem is equivalent to a complementary monopoly/monopsony problem. We also show that in environments with complementary monopoly/monopsony, markets work very poorly. Our results suggest that markets will not solve problems in environments with global externalities or pure public goods. An example suggests that the complementary monopoly problem diminishes when the public goods are local, a result reminiscent of Tiebout (1956 ) (see also Scotchmer, 1985; Scotchmer and Wooders, 1986; Wooders, 1986; Chari and Jones, 1989) . Thus, when public goods are local, market mechanisms seem likely to work well.
The results in this paper are closely related to those in Roberts (1976) , Rob (1989) , and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) . Roberts, in a public goods setting, shows that truth-telling outcomes of dominant strategy mechanisms satisfying individual rationality and a continuity property converge to no provision of public goods. Rob, in an externality setting, shows that the probability that an externality-creating project is undertaken under private information given that it should be undertaken under complete information converges to zero as the number of people harmed goes to infinity. Mailath and Postlewaite, in a public goods setting, establish a result similar to Roberts' for Bayesian mechanisms with private information about the value of an indivisible public project. They replace Roberts' continuity assumption on mechanisms with assumptions on the private information of agents. We extend Roberts' results to a Nash equilibrium and to settings with externalities. We show that changing the distribution of property rights changes an externality setting to one with public goods. We extend the Rob and Mailath and Postlewaite results to environments where the project size is variable, utility functions are more general, and the interim efficient outcome is not necessarily zero provision.
The equivalence between externality (public goods) and complementary monopoly (monopsony) economies established in this paper implies that settings with strong complementarities and strategic play will exhibit problems similar to those in the literature on the free rider problem. Examples of such settings include the work of Becker and Murphy (1992) , Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) .
In Section 2 we provide two examples which illustrate our equivalence result between externality economies and complementary monopoly economies. These examples also show that markets are likely to work very badly in environments with complementary monopolies. We also provide an example which illustrates that markets can work very well when externalities are local. In Section 3 we borrow from the literature on mechanism design (Hurwicz, 1972) and represent a large class of theories by assumptions on abstract mechanisms. We argue that our class of theories provides a description of the workings of market-like arrangements. We show that all of the theories in our class predict the same outcome: market-like arrangements provide extremely inefficient allocations with global externalities or public goods. In Section 4 we consider environments with private information and show that an even larger class of theories predicts that market-like arrangements will work very badly.
Examples
We begin with a simple example. We start with an economy with an obvious externality, add the needed markets, assign the property rights for these new goods, posit a form for competition, and calculate the equilibrium. In the example, adding markets to correct externalities creates an economy with as many complementary goods as agents. We posit a natural form of competition and show that when the number of residents is large, outcomes are extremely inefficient. Example 1. Consider an economy in which there is a town with a number of firms, each producing the same final product for sale to an external market. Assume that each producer owns a factory that produces smoke in addition to the output. Assume that the smoke emanating from each factory spreads uniformly over all locations throughout the town and is proportional to the output of the factory. Then the total smoke over any location in the town is proportional to the total output of the industry. Assume that each firm can produce as much of the output as it likes at zero marginal cost and that demand for the final product is linear in price, D(p) = a − bp, where a > 0, b > 0, and a > b. We assume that the firms are perfect competitors in the output market. Finally, we assume that there are n residents in the town. We assume for simplicity that the residents have utility functions over money m and smoke consumption s of the form U (m, s) = m − s/n. (We will see in a moment why it is s/n and not s.)
The equilibrium for this example is clear: p * = 0, aggregate output of both the final good and smoke is a, and the utility of the residents is m * − a/n, where m * is the initial allocation of money. The example is standard enough; in their calculations of profit-maximizing production plans, the firms ignore the social cost of their production of smoke, thereby imposing an externality on the residents. Thus, the market acts as if the marginal social cost of both output and smoke is zero, while in reality it is $1 ($1/n of disutility to each resident for each unit of smoke produced).
In terms of the Coase Theorem, the problem in this economy is that no markets for pollution over the homesites exist. The solution is equally straightforward: Introduce such markets, and let competition proceed as usual. Let each household be endowed with S units of smoke rights, where S is a large positive number (at least as large as a). Smoke rights are a "good" rather than a "bad" from the residents' point of view. We define preferences over smoke rights as follows. The utility of a resident who sells s units of smoke rights in this private goods economy is
Thus, utility is increasing in the consumption of smoke rights. Each firm must purchase one unit of each smoke right to produce one unit of output. Note that we have defined a private ownership economy with perfect complementarities for which the nonwasteful allocations coincide with the feasible allocations of a public goods economy. (Foley, 1967; Milleron, 1972; and Starrett, 1972 use this connection between public goods economies and perfect complementarities in private goods economies as a device to facilitate the proof of the existence of Lindahl equilibrium. However, they do not exploit the relationship between this equivalence and problems of market power.) In keeping with the spirit of competitive markets, we assume that the firms take the prices of the smoke rights as given.
In the perfectly competitive outcome, each of the smoke rights sells for a price p j = 1/n, the final good sells for p = 1, and quantities a − b of the final product and of each of the n types of smoke rights are used. It is easy to see that this equilibrium is efficient (and is the Lindahl equilibrium of the original economy).
Given that the markets for the individual smoke rights are so thin, the assumption of price-taking behavior is questionable. For this reason, we examine a different, more strategic, notion of equilibrium. Note that this approach is not contrary to Coase's original intent in any way. In fact, Coase seems to think that efficient allocations would arise out of bargaining between the parties (although exactly what he had in mind is unclear).
For the moment, we assume that competition takes the form of residents setting prices for their site-specific smoke rights. If resident i prices his or her smoke rights at p i , i = 1, . . . , n, then firms act as if their marginal cost of production is n i =1 p i . In this case, the price in the final goods market is p i (because of our assumption of perfect competition in the final goods market). Then output is q(p) = a − b( p i ), and revenues from sales of smoke rights for the households are r i = p i q(p), giving utility m * + r i + (S − q)/n. It is straightforward to check that, given the prices set by other residents, the best price for resident 1 is given by
It follows that the equilibrium prices for smoke rights are given by
for all i . Hence, from the firms' point of view, the marginal cost of production (and hence the price of the final good as well) is
Note that the price of the final good is greater than 1, which is the Lindahl equilibrium price, and that the quantity produced is less than the Lindahl equilibrium quantity.
In this example, in effect, each resident is selling an output that costs $1/n per unit to produce (the dollar cost of the loss of one unit of smoke rights) and is maximizing profits. If the residents could get together and sell their inputs to the firms jointly, they could do much better. In this case, the best price for them to charge is (1 + a/b)/2n apiece, which gives a final product price of (1 + a/b)/2, which is less than the equilibrium price in equation (3).
That the equilibrium is inefficient is probably not surprising since we have given the residents an element of monopoly power, which they exploit. In light of this, a natural question to ask is whether the monopoly power diminishes as the number of residents is increased. From (3) we see that as the population increases, the equilibrium price of the final product converges monotonically to the reservation price, a/b. So as the population increases, output of the industry and, therefore, production of smoke converge monotonically to zero. The monopoly power, instead of diminishing, causes output to deviate far from the efficient level.
Note that through our choice of normalization, we have constructed a sequence of economies in which the Lindahl equilibrium is unchanged as a function of the population size n, in the sense that the output and price of the final product are independent of n. Of course, the prices of the individual smoke rights do change with the population size because they are given by 1/n in the nth economy. (Thus, we have adopted the normalization recommended by Milleron (1972) . Roberts (1976) uses an alternative normalization in which the reservation price is na/b and U = m − s for all n.) Cournot (1838, chap. 9 ) considers a version of this example in a quite different setting. In his model a monopolist producer of zinc and a monopolist producer of copper produce for a perfectly competitive market for brass. Cournot also considers the n-input complementary monopoly problem analogous to this example and obtains similar results. An interesting feature of this example is that it illustrates that complementary monopoly problems are pervasive in privatized externality economies. The problems caused by complementarities are recurrent themes in the literature on the foundations of perfect competition (see Hart, 1980; Makowski, 1980; Jones, 1987a,b) .
Example 2. In Example 1, residents of the town have property rights to the air quality over their land. As we saw, this gave each resident a monopoly over the air quality over his or her plot of land. An obvious question is, To what extent are the problems identified in the strategic formulation of Example 1 a product of this monopoly power? To answer this question, we consider an economy where the property rights to air quality over a particular plot of land are not distributed to the owners of the land. Rather, they are distributed to a third party (or group of third parties) who neither resides in the town nor consumes the output of the industry. The third party sells the rights to produce (and hence pollute) to both the residents of the town and the firms producing the final output. The third party can be interpreted either as the government or as individuals. The purpose of this exercise is to ask, in this situation, whether residents of the town have sufficient incentives to buy these rights so as to reduce pollution and whether this procedure will generate efficient outcomes. We find that the outcomes are still extremely inefficient. An interesting feature of this example is that distributing property rights to nonresidents creates an economy with complementary monopsonies. This feature implies that the equilibrium output is too high relative to the efficient level.
The demand function is the same as in Example 1. The amount of the property rights distributed to the third party is the same for each plot of land and is denoted by S . The utility of a resident who consumes m units of money and x units of smoke rights is given by U i (m, x ) = m + x /n. As in Example 1, firms must purchase one unit of each type of smoke rights to produce one unit of output. Thus, the complementarity between the smoke rights as productive inputs remains, although the initial ownership is different.
If S is at least as large as a − b (the Lindahl equilibrium output level), then it is easy to show that the perfectly competitive equilibrium outcome is the Lindahl equilibrium. Each resident purchases S − (a − b) units of smoke rights over his or her land, and firms purchase the rest. Each of the individual smoke rights is priced at 1/n, which results in an equilibrium price of 1 for the final output as in Example 1.
We turn now to a strategic formulation of this economy. To focus attention on the strategic behavior of the town residents, we adopt the simplifying assumption that firms, purchasers of the final good, and owners of the smoke rights behave as price takers. We allow residents to buy smoke rights only over their own land. For simplicity, we analyze a price game in which residents act as price leaders with the output market acting as a competitive fringe. The owners of the smoke rights sell these rights inelastically. Accordingly, each resident sets a price, p i , for the smoke rights over his or her plot of land. Let P denote the vector of these prices. Because the firms must buy one unit of each of the smoke rights for each unit of output produced, the firms' marginal cost of production is p i . It follows that the price of the final output is p = p i , and thus output is given by q(P ) = a − b p i . Each resident therefore purchases S − q(P ) units of smoke rights and pays p i (S − q(P )). The utility of household i is thus
It can be shown that if S < a−b, in equilibrium, the residents do not purchase any smoke rights. Because of this, we confine attention to the case where S ≥ a − b. Given the prices set by the other residents, resident 1's best price is then
From equation (4), it is straightforward to calculate that the equilibrium prices are
It follows that the marginal cost of production -and, hence, the price of the final product -is given by
In equilibrium the residents buy S − q(P ) units of smoke rights. Using the demand curve, we see that this quantity is
From equation (6), we see that as the population grows, residents' purchases of smoke rights converge to zero. Therefore, production reaches the maximum level possible given the initial distribution of smoke rights.
This example illustrates that the efficient level of smoke will not be produced under this alternative property rights system unless the amount auctioned off is chosen correctly, that is, unless S = a − b. In particular, schemes that distribute large quantities of pollution rights in the hope that residents will restrict output to the optimal level through their voluntary purchases will not work in general. In one such scheme, for example, firms are allocated pollution rights according to their historical level of output and trade is then allowed. Such schemes may be superior to direct regulation of output in that they are likely to promote allocative efficiency across firms, but they will not yield the efficient level of pollution overall. Schemes that require voluntary contributions in order to reduce the overall level of pollution will be inefficient because they create free-rider problems. When individuals choose their levels of contributions, they ignore the benefits received by others from the resulting reduction in output. Therefore, they contribute less than the optimum amount. In essence, this alternative distribution of property rights changes the nature of the problem from one of externalities to one of public goods. Therefore, although the outcomes differ, the inefficiency remains.
Example 3. Our third example is a slight modification of Example 1. In this example, we consider a situation with local rather than global externalities. We show that market mechanisms work very well in this example. The example suggests that the Coase Theorem is likely to be valid in situations where good substitutes are available.
Consider an economy like that considered in Example 1 except that there are two towns, each with n residents and many price-taking producers of the final product. Smoke from firms in each town spreads uniformly across the town, but does not affect the other town. Demand for the final good is as in Example 1. It is easy to show that in the economy without smoke rights the equilibrium price of the output good p * = 0 and the amount produced q * = a. (The proportion of the final good produced in the two towns is not determined in equilibrium.)
Now let us introduce individualized pollution markets as we did in Example 1. A fundamental difference between this economy and the one we considered earlier is that in order to produce a unit of output, a firm need not buy one unit of smoke rights from each household; rather, it need only purchase one unit from each household in the town in which it plans to produce.
Formally, let S − s i be the amount of smoke rights consumed by resident i , i = 1, . . . , 2n, where we will assume that residents 1 through n live in town 1 and the rest live in town 2. The utility functions of the residents are given by
It is immediate that the Lindahl equilibria of this economy have each smoke right priced at 1/n and the final output priced at 1.
As before, we assume that residents set prices for their individual smoke rights, which the producing firms then take as given, and that firms behave as perfect competitors in that they charge marginal cost for their output. We assume that only output from the town with the lower cost of production is sold and that, in case of ties, the market is split evenly.
Letting p i be the price announced by resident i , Π 1 be the sum of the prices in town 1, and Π 2 be the sum of the prices in town 2, we see that the payoff to resident i as a function of the announced prices is then
. . , n and similarly for i = n + 1, . . . , 2n. The Lindahl equilibrium (that is, p i = 1/n for all i ) for this economy is clearly a symmetric equilibrium of the game as given: If any resident raised his or her price, no production would take place in that town and hence the resident would be no better off than before; of course, residents would not lower their prices. It turns out that this is the only symmetric equilibrium for the game in which output of the final good is positive. The argument for this result is familiar. If all charge some price higher than 1/n, then any individual can bring all of the production of the industry to his or her town by lowering his or her own price only slightly. Since the marginal benefit of this change is 1 and the marginal cost is 1/n, the individual will be better off by making this change.
There are at least two other types of equilibria. These arise due to the difficulty of coordinating price offers among residents in a town. First, suppose that for all combinations of n − 1 residents of each town, the sum of the offered prices is larger than the reservation price, a/b. Then no individual resident can, by lowering the price unilaterally, lower the marginal cost of production in his or her town to the point that any firm could break even and sell a positive quantity. Second, if all of the residents of one town charge the one-town equilibrium prices outlined in Example 1 and all groups of n − 1 residents of the other town charge prices summing to more than that of the first town, then we have an equilibrium with production in only one town. Again, since no individual in the second town can lower his or her price enough unilaterally, there will be no production in that town.
It is interesting to contrast Examples 1 and 3. Many readers may not find Example 1 too surprising since the markets for smoke rights are highly individualized and hence intrinsically thin. Thus, although it might be surprising that the problem gets worse as the number of residents grows, it should not be surprising that the inefficiency does not go away. As Arrow (1970) argues, although we can get rid of an externality problem by creating markets for pollution rights, these markets are likely to be thin, so that perfect competition may not be the correct notion of equilibrium to employ.
Example 3 illustrates that we should not make this judgment too hastily. In this example, markets for individualized smoke rights are thin, but because good substitutes exist, no individual has market power. That is, monopoly power does not necessarily imply market power. (See Mas-Colell, 1975; Hart, 1979; and Jones, 1987a for other examples of the same phenomenon.) The extent of the complementarity of the goods in the production process plays a crucial role in the contrast between Examples 1 and 3. In this sense, we might argue that market mechanisms are likely to work for Meade's (1952) beekeeper and apple orchard example. (If the price charged by the orchard owner is too high, go to another orchard.) The mechanism is also likely to work in Coase's (1960) candy maker and noise creation example. (Move the candy factory, or move the doctor.) But Examples 1 and 2 suggest that market mechanisms are highly unlikely to represent a reasonable solution to either the acid rain problem or the problem of allocating funds for national defense. This is reminiscent of the insight in Ostroy (1984) , where it is shown that the availability of good substitutes for people (or groups of people) is essential for the plausibility of Walrasian equilibrium.
A more general approach
The examples of the preceding section suggest two possible approaches to the public goods problem. The first approach is to ask how a central authority might ensure efficient public goods provision by designing a set of rules restricting the behavior of private agents. This approach has been extensively explored in the mechanism design literature (for example, Hurwicz, 1972; Ledyard, 1977, 1987) . The second approach is to ask what outcomes market-like arrangements will produce.
We take the second approach, following Roberts (1976) . We must first take a stand on what constitutes the key features of market-like arrangements. The mechanism design literature provides a convenient language for this purpose. We formalize market-like arrangements by considering a large class of mechanisms sharing two key properties: a strong notion of property rights and a uniform continuity requirement. We show that if a mechanism satisfies these two properties, decentralized voluntary exchange leads to extremely inefficient outcomes. This approach generalizes Example 1 to a larger class of models of strategic interaction.
We consider a more general environment than in the examples. The commodity space is R n+1 . The last commodity is interpreted as a numeraire consumption good. The remaining commodities, i = 1, . . . , n, are interpreted as consumption of smoke rights. There are n consumers with consumption sets X i = R n+1 + . The preferences of consumer i are given by
Notice that consumers care only about consumption of their own smoke rights, that is, smoke produced over their own location. Let 
Note that the endowments (which are the property rights) convey to each agent monopoly power over smoke produced at the agent's location. The complementarities inherent with externalities are captured in the description of the technology. To relate this economy to the demand functions specified in the examples, we can set R(q) = qD −1 (q). An allocation is feasible if i x i − y = i w i and y ∈ Y n . From this description, it is easy to construct an economy with externalities as in the examples of the preceding section. The two economies are equivalent in the sense that the nonwasteful allocations of the private goods economy are in one-to-one correspondence with the feasible allocations of the externalities economy. This equivalence is implicit in what follows.
We now describe an allocation mechanism for the private goods economy. We consider a general description of the workings of a marketplace. Fix the number of players at n. Each player chooses an action a i from an action set A i , i = 1, . . . , n. Let a denote the vector of actions. A mechanism for our economy is a collection of action sets and outcome functions x (a) and y(a) which map the vector of actions into the space of feasible allocations. We assume that there is a class of allowable payoffs
Let N (u) denote the Nash equilibrium correspondence given a mechanism.
We will find it convenient to consider an alternative mechanism with action sets for each player given by U . The interpretation here is that each player reports the utility functions of all players in the economy. Let t i ∈ U (the type of player i ) denote the vector of utility functions reported by player i so that t ij ∈ U j denotes i 's report of j 's utility function. Let t denote the vector of types reported by all players. A revelation mechanism is a collection of type sets and allocation functions x r (t) and y r (t) which map reported types into the space of feasible allocations. Following Myerson (1979) , we can easily establish the revelation principle: The equilibrium outcomes of any mechanism can be implemented as a truth-telling equilibrium of a revelation mechanism.
Note that the revelation principle contains two conclusions. First, it follows that we need consider only games in which the strategy space is given by vectors of reported utility functions. Second, it allows attention to be restricted to the truth-telling equilibria of the revelation mechanism. In some of the results that follow, we will use only the first of these two properties. So, in some cases at least, it is not necessary to construct the revelation game to check whether our assumptions for decentralized mechanisms are satisfied.
The space of possible utility functions we consider in the revelation mechanism is U i = {utility functions over smoke rights on [0, Q] which are nondecreasing, with u i (0) = 0}. Associated with a revelation mechanism for our economy are outcome functions x (t) and y(t). For convenience let m i denote the consumption of the numeraire consumption good by consumer i , and let q denote the amount of smoke produced. Then the outcome functions must satisfy
and
for all t ∈ U n , where m i and q j denote the endowments of the consumption good and smoke rights, respectively.
The payoffs are then given by
We can define a sequence of mechanisms as the population size n changes. Note that the underlying commodity space and the spaces over which the outcome functions are defined also change. As we change the population size, we also allow the utility functions to change. We denote the utility function of consumer i by u i (q i ; n). We now prove that under a set of assumptions, the equilibrium output of the revelation mechanisms converges to zero. Suppose, therefore, that the sequence of mechanisms satisfies the following:
Assumption A1. (Voluntary trade). For all n, for all t
∈ U n , m i (t, n) + t ii (q i (t, n); n) ≥ m i + t ii (q i ; n), i = 1, . . . , n.
Assumption A2. (Continuity).
For all δ > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that for all n, for all i = 1, . . . , n, for all t ∈ U n ,
Assumption A1 is one way to represent the idea that every consumer has a right not to be affected by smoke unless he or she consents. This condition is stronger than the standard voluntary participation or individual rationality constraint familiar from the mechanism design literature. We require the outcome of a mechanism to make each individual at least as well off, when welfare is calculated with the reported utility function, as he or she would be without any trade at all. This assumption reduces to the standard individual rationality constraint in dominant strategy mechanisms.
Assumption A2 requires that no mechanism punish small deviations from truth-telling too severely. For example, mechanisms that simply impose efficient allocations if all reports agree and prescribe severe penalties for deviation are disallowed. One such mechanism gives each consumer his or her endowment if there is any disagreement among consumers about reported utility functions. If all consumers agree in their reports, the mechanism computes the Lindahl equilibrium for such an economy and gives each consumer the associated allocations. Clearly, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium for such a mechanism. Although this mechanism is extremely discontinuous, it is possible to construct similar mechanisms that are continuous, but which punish deviations severely enough. A key feature of Assumption A2 is that it requires mechanisms to be uniformly continuous across the sequence of economies. Thus, the power of any individual to affect aggregate outcomes by small deviations is limited uniformly across the sequence of economies.
An alternative (and stronger) condition would require a small change in any consumer's report to have a correspondingly small effect on the allocations received by every other consumer. This condition might be more suitable for environments where the notion of an aggregate outcome is more difficult to define.
Mechanisms satisfying Assumptions A1 and A2 seem to us to capture two key features of market mechanisms. Hence, we say that a sequence of mechanisms satisfying Assumptions A1 and A2 is decentralized. Theorem 1. (Decentralized truth-telling mechanisms yield zero output in the limit). Consider a sequence of utility functions u 1 (1); u 1 (2), u 2 (2); u 1 (3), u 2 (3), u 3 (3) Proof. The proof of this and all of the results in this paper can be found in Chari and Jones (1991) , available at http://research.mpls.frb.fed.us/research.
The result that q(n) → 0 does not necessarily imply that the outcome is inefficient. In fact, it is easy to construct sequences of economies where this is the only efficient outcome. A simple example is the case where u i (n) is the same (and nonzero) for all i and n.
Thus, the importance of the theorem lies in the fact that the result holds for a large class of economies in which the efficient outcomes are bounded away from zero. The examples of Section 2 belong to this class. Another example is given by u i (n) = (1/n)u i (1). This gives rise to a sequence of economies in which the Lindahl equilibrium is independent of n (and positive in cases of interest). Other examples of this type give rise to sequences of economies in which the Lindahl equilibrium quantity is bounded away from zero, though dependent on n. The theorem shows that with decentralized mechanisms the equilibrium level of output converges to zero even in this class of economies.
Theorem 1 shows that the truth-telling equilibria of decentralized mechanisms yield extremely inefficient outcomes for a large class of economies. In the examples of Section 2 and those considered below, our assumptions are difficult to verify since truth-telling is not an equilibrium of these games. The requirement of truth-telling can be dropped for mechanisms satisfying a monotonicity assumption. This assumption requires that the allocation of smoke rights be increasing in each person's reported valuation. Proof. See Chari and Jones (1991) , available at http://research.mpls.frb.fed.us/ research.
Assumption A3. (Monotonicity). For all n, for all t
∈ U n , for all i = 1, . . . , n, for allt i ∈ U such thatt ii (x ) ≥ t ii (x ) for all x ∈ [0, Q], q i (t −i ,t i , n) ≥ q i (t, n).
Monopoly power and the free-rider problem
We have transformed our environment into a private ownership economy and shown that decentralized mechanisms lead, in general, to extremely inefficient outcomes with a large enough population. In this formulation, monopoly power in the ownership of smoke rights plays a central role in generating inefficient outcomes. Alternatively, we could have set up a mechanism design problem in an environment with externalities. In this case, the preferences of the agents over smoke are given by m i − v i (q), where q is the amount of smoke produced in the town and v i is a nondecreasing function on [0, Q] . A revelation mechanism in this economy is defined analogously to the setup in the privatized economy as a collection of type sets for agents and outcome functions m(t), q(t) which specify consumption vectors of the numeraire good and production of smoke, respectively. Feasibility requires that a mechanism satisfy equation (7). Consider a sequence of mechanisms as the population size, n, changes. Suppose that the sequence of mechanisms satisfies Assumption A2 and Assumption A1'. (Veto power). For all n and for all t ∈ U n ,
The veto power assumption, A1', makes it explicit that the voluntary trade assumption, A1, is a description of the legal environment underlying the privatized economy.
It is easy to prove, along the lines of Theorems 1 and 2, that if the revenue function is bounded, then the equilibrium output of smoke converges to zero. This formulation of the problem shows that our result of extreme inefficiency does not depend on the particular way that we have privatized the externality economy. In fact, the privatized economy formulation is more general than the externality formulation because any allocation of the externality economy is feasible for the privatized economy.
In the externality formulation, the extreme inefficiency of outcomes results from the free-rider problem. In the privatized economy, the extreme inefficiency results from the complementary monopoly power. In this sense, the free-rider problem is a problem of monopoly power.
Comments, examples, and extensions
(i) Recall that Theorem 2 does not require the assumption of truth-telling. It is therefore possible to directly verify the assumptions in some specific applications without first calculating the equilibrium correspondence and then constructing the resulting revelation mechanism. We will use this fact repeatedly in what follows. As an example of the types of games covered by Theorem 2, suppose that each individual has the same allocation of rights and that, for a sequence of mechanisms, output is given by a continuous function of the sum of the reported utilities of the agents: q = g( n i =1 t ii (q − q)), where g : U → R is monotonedecreasing and uniformly continuous (with respect to the sup-norm topology) on U . Then Assumptions A2 and A3 are automatically satisfied. It follows that Theorem 2 applies as long as Assumption A1 is satisfied.
A specific example illustrates the usefulness of this formulation. Consider a mechanism in which each agent announces a vector of utility functions, t i . Output is determined by equating R(q) to n i =1 t ii (q − q), and each individual receives a payment equal to t ii at the q given above. Under this mechanism, Assumptions A2 and A3 are clearly satisfied for a large class of revenue functions R. Clearly, since Assumption A1 is satisfied, Theorem 2 holds.
Alternatively, this construction can be interpreted as a nonlinear pricing game in which each agent chooses a price schedule p i (q) as a function of the level of pollution with the interpretation that he or she receives p i (q)q. Let q(t) be chosen by equating R(q)/q to n i =1 p i (q). Competitive firms produce output and make the required payments to individuals as in the examples of Section 2. Assumption A1 is automatically satisfied. As long as R(q)/q is continuous, Assumption A2 is satisfied.
Consider a slight variation on this pricing game. Each individual announces a vector of utilities t ii (q) which are differentiable. Let q(t) be given by setting R(q)/q = n i =1 t ii (q). Suppose that R is such that the resulting value of q is monotone-decreasing in t ii . Payments are given by t ii (q)q. Note that, as written, this mechanism does not satisfy Assumption A2 in general since small changes in the reported utilities can be associated with large changes in the associated marginal utilities. Nevertheless, the proof of Theorem 1 holds for this example without any change whatsoever.
Thus, Assumption A2 can be relaxed even further. In particular, the proof of Theorem 1 requires only that Assumption A2 hold for deviations of the form t(x ) = t(x ) + αx . Therefore, although Assumption A2 is sufficient for the result, it is not necessary.
(ii) The conclusions of the theorems do not hold for some mechanisms. We discussed one such example before the statement of the theorems. As another example, consider an extension of the bargaining game to our environment. Nature moves first, choosing a dictator. The dictator's strategy is to select an allocation for each agent in the economy. The strategies of the other players are limited to either agreeing or disagreeing. All players move simultaneously. If all players other than the dictator agree, the outcome is the allocation named by the dictator. If any player disagrees, the outcome is for each player to consume his or her endowment. This game clearly has one equilibrium that is efficient (among the players of the game). It follows that for some sequences of utility profiles, the quantity of output in this equilibrium is uniformly bounded away from zero. (This game has other equilibria as well. In particular, zero output is always an equilibrium of the game as formulated.) It can be verified that Assumption A1 is not satisfied for this example.
(iii) One objection to Theorems 1 and 2 is that our proof strategy requires deviations which may be large relative to an individual's true utility function. In cases of interest, u i (n) converges to zero as n → ∞, but the deviations we use do not converge to zero. In other words, the space of utility functions from which individuals make their reports is large relative to the space of utility functions for which efficient outcomes have output bounded away from zero. This objection can be addressed by replacing Assumption A2 with a Lipschitz continuity condition. It is then possible to prove an analog of Theorem 1. (See Chari and Jones, 1991, for details.) 
The general approach with private information
The voluntary trade assumptions of Section 3 are very strong notions of property rights given our assumption of public information. Our goal in this section is to show that this assumption can be considerably weakened in environments with private information. We prove a result for the private information case which is an analog of Theorem 1. We show that either with independently drawn utilities and a "standard" individual rationality assumption or with a constant support assumption and ex post individual rationality, the equilibrium level of output converges to zero. Although we do not explore this here, presumably analogs of Theorem 2 also hold in these settings (see Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990 , on this for the analog of Theorem 1 in a public goods setting).
Let U be the set of nondecreasing, continuous functions on [0, Q] with u(0) = 0. The utility functions of the n players are random variables on U n . Let S n i denote the support of the marginal probability distribution for player i . An allocation mechanism for our private goods economy can be defined analogously to that in Section 3. As in that section, it is straightforward to establish the revelation principle. We will restrict attention to revelation mechanisms. To simplify notation, we will suppress consumption of smoke rights at location j for individual i when j / = i . A revelation mechanism for an economy with n agents is denoted by Γ n and is a collection of (2n + 1) measurable outcome functions given by m i :
where m i denotes consumption of the numeraire good by agent i , q i denotes consumption of smoke rights by agent i , and q denotes output. We require that these outcome functions satisfy feasibility:
for all u in the support of S n i , where m i denotes agent i 's endowment of the numeraire good.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ n is a strategy profile consisting of n measurable functions denoted by s i , each mapping U to U such that, for all i , for any measurable function,ŝ i :
Truth-telling is an equilibrium of the revelation mechanism if s i (u) = u for all i is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We now turn to the assumptions that define decentralized mechanisms. We will start with the analog of Assumption A1: Assumption B1. (Interim voluntary trade) . For all n, for all i , the revelation mechanism satisfies
This assumption is the standard individual rationality condition in the mechanism design literature. It says that if agent i believes that all other players are telling the truth, the agent can by telling the truth guarantee him-or herself a conditional expected utility at least as large as the utility of the agent's endowment. The assumption captures the idea that after an agent sees his or her draw of the utility function, the agent can leave with the endowment intact.
Note that our individual rationality assumption is substantially weaker with private information. To see this, suppose that the utility functions of all the players are perfectly correlated random variables. Then the utility function of any player is known if all the other players tell the truth about their utility functions. One can devise mechanisms in this case which ignore reports by a player of his or her own utility function and thus limit the monopoly power of any given player. Such mechanisms satisfy Assumption B1, but clearly will not satisfy the voluntary trade assumption, A1. Because of this, we will need an additional assumption on the probability distribution over types. We will assume that the utility functions are independent random variables. Alternatively, we can replace Assumption B1 and independence with the following:
Assumption B1 . (Ex post voluntary trade). For all n, for all i , the revelation mechanism satisfies
Furthermore, in the proofs of our earlier theorems, we constructed deviations that were possibly large relative to an individual's true utility function. In the private information case, any deviation must be credible; that is, it must be in the support of the domain of utility functions. Thus, we need to ensure that the support of the domain of utility functions does not shrink too rapidly with the number of players. The assumption that we will use requires that if the utility function over smoke rights is flat near the smoke rights endowment, there is a small credible deviation which makes the utility function steeper.
In the case of perfectly correlated types, Assumptions B1 and B2 are roughly equivalent to Assumption A1. We will also require the obvious analog of the continuity assumption (A2).
Consider a sequence of mechanisms Γ n . We have the following: Proof. See Chari and Jones (1991) , available at http://research.mpls.frb.fed.us/ research.
The proof of this result mirrors that of Theorem 1. As in Theorem 1, because R(·) is bounded, some agent must be getting paid nothing eventually for giving up smoke rights. If such an agent can credibly claim to value smoke rightsthat is, if the support statement is satisfied -then individual rationality requires positive payments to this agent. Thus, to prevent such deviations, the mechanism asymptotically requires no agent to sell smoke rights, and output converges to zero.
Comments and examples
(iv) With no private information, there are clearly many environments for which efficient outcomes are bounded away from zero. With private information, however, interim efficient mechanisms (defined as in Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983) cannot punish individuals too severely for small deviations from truth-telling. Hence, it is possible that all interim efficient mechanisms yield zero output in the limit [see Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) for results of this kind]. We construct an example to show that interim efficient mechanisms need not yield zero output in the limit. The example also demonstrates the role of uniform continuity in Theorem 3.
Example 4. Suppose that the utility functions are given by
where θ i is identically, independently distributed across i . The random variable θ i is distributed uniformly over [0, 1/n] with density p n and uniformly over [1/n, 1] with density r n given by r n = (1 − p n /n)/(1 − 1/n). Note that we have written the utility function directly as a function of output rather than as a function of smoke rights.
The inverse demand function is given by D −1 (q) = 4 − q. Our aim is not to characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms. Rather, we construct a particular mechanism for which the sum of the expected utilities over all individuals is bounded away from zero with positive probability. Thus, we restrict attention to efficient mechanisms which maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents. If such efficient mechanisms yield zero output in the limit, they yield zero utility. Then we have a contradiction and, therefore, the desired result.
Consider, therefore, the following mechanism. If all agents report θ i ∈ [0, 1/n], then q = 1; otherwise, q = 0. Each agent receives an equal share of the revenues.
It is clear that for any consumer i , if θ i ≤ 1/n, then a (weakly) dominant strategy is to report the true value of θ. Hence, in this case, payoffs must satisfy
The sum of the expected utilities then satisfies
Clearly, many sequences p n yield welfare levels bounded away from zero. For example, suppose that p n = nπ 1/n , where 0 < π ≤ 1. Then
Furthermore, the probability that θ i ≤ 1/n for all i converges to a positive number π. Efficient mechanisms must yield at least as high a utility level. Hence, the output of smoke cannot converge to zero. Efficient mechanisms in this example violate the uniform continuity assumption. The particular mechanism we consider is discontinuous at θ i = 1/n. However, it is straightforward to prove that for fixed n, the efficient mechanism yields output levels which are continuous in θ. But this sequence of mechanisms does not yield output levels uniformly continuous in θ.
For utility functions of the type considered here, if the density functions are uniformly bounded away from zero, one can use techniques similar to those in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) to show that output converges to zero even for mechanisms for which the continuity assumption is violated. (See Chari and Jones, 1992.) 5 Concluding comments (v) The appeal of the results in Sections 3 and 4 is that they show that a large class of theories of the workings of markets give rise to the same prediction: In large economies with decentralized systems, problems caused by externalities lead to outcomes far from the efficient level. Two assumptions play a key role in our analysis. First, we require a strong voluntary trade assumption. Second, we require that the mechanisms be uniformly continuous in the actions of consumers. We call a sequence of mechanisms which satisfy these assumptions a theory of decentralized markets. Examples 1 through 3 and comment (i) suggest the sense in which market-like arrangements satisfy our assumptions. Comment (ii) provides examples of mechanisms which yield good outcomes and provides an indication of the sense in which such mechanisms are centralized. Therefore, we think that our assumptions are a reasonable way to capture decentralized market interactions. Our results imply that mechanisms that yield good outcomes in economies with externalities must necessarily contain rules limiting the rights or restricting the actions of private agents. Our results also suggest that the search for such mechanisms is exceedingly important precisely because unfettered markets are likely to function very badly in providing pure public goods. Although decentralized theories lead to inefficient outcomes with global externalities, Example 3 suggests that if externalities are local it may be possible to construct decentralized theories which yield efficient outcomes (see also Chari and Jones, 1989) .
(vi) Our interpretation of Coase is but one of many (rivaling that of Keynes, we're sure). Nothing as explicit as our analysis appears in Coase's paper. Certainly, Coase never mentions adding markets as the solution to the externalities problem. The notion that the problem is essentially one of missing markets appears explicitly as a definition in Heller and Starrett (1976) and is often attributed to Arrow (1970) , but can probably be traced further back, at least in some form. Something very close to this notion appears in Meade (1952) and is one interpretation of Lindahl (1958) .
The point of this paper is to understand why the markets are missing. That is, do economies with public goods or externalities present a significantly more severe problem for decentralization through self-interested voluntary exchange than economies with only private goods? The results of Sections 3 and 4 suggest that the answer to this question is that they do. However, Example 3 suggests that these problems may not be universal.
(vii) In our view, the most important generalizations of the results obtained to this point would involve extensions along the lines of Example 3. Ideally, we would like a set of conditions under which theories of markets give rise to efficient outcomes in economies with local public goods and many potential locations. This reasoning leads us naturally to consider alternative formulations of Tiebout's (1956) hypothesis. Note that the result given in Example 3 differs from the explanation offered by Tiebout in at least one important way: Mobility is extremely limited. That is, we do not allow agents to move at all (although output of the final good is allowed to move freely). This lack of mobility leaves open the possibility that the residents of a given town may be able to exploit monopoly power relative to one another. This feature can give rise to inefficiencies even with local public goods (see Chari and Jones, 1989) . These considerations lead us naturally to consider (as Tiebout does) models in which town formation itself is endogenous. In this regard, the recent work by Scotchmer (1985) , Scotchmer and Wooders (1986) , and Wooders (1986) contain useful insights.
